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This paper analyses whether the evolution of water law in the Australian colony 
of New South Wales (NSW) contradicts theoretical models that suggest in arid 
countries correlative, land based water rights will be replaced with individual 
ownership.  Evidence from NSW shows a series of Supreme Court decisions 
between 1850-1870 adopted correlative riparian rights thereby implying that 
common law was inefficient.  However, further consideration of factors that gave 
rise to these decisions suggests the value of water was higher when used in unity 
because of the arid climate and non-consumptive nature of water use in the 
pastoral industry. The findings suggest that where intensity of water use is low, 
economic development is dominated by industries requiring low levels of capital 
investment, and acute water scarcity prevails, correlative water rights are 
efficient. 
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THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRELATIVE WATER RIGHTS IN COLONIAL 
AUSTRALIA: A THEORETICAL CONTRADICTION? 
 
 
Evidence from the Australian colony of New South Wales (NSW) appears to contradict 
the theoretical proposition that in arid countries, land based water rights like riparian 
rights will give way to private individual ownership because the latter allows for a more 
precise definition of rights.
i  In contrast with empirical evidence from the American west 
during the nineteenth century and formalisation of prior appropriation by the judiciary, 
NSW courts did not promote a shift to individual ownership.  Instead, a series of 
decisions applied the riparian doctrine as it evolved during the period 1850 to 1870.  This 
outcome is even more remarkable given the extent of flexibility afforded to NSW courts 
by Imperial legislation that introduced the common law to the colony.   
 
NSW inherited the common law of riparian rights by virtue of the Australian Courts Act 
(1828).
ii  This act established the date for the introduction of British common law, 
including riparian rights, to the colony as July 25, 1828.  After this date, section 24 of this 
legislation meant English court decisions no longer bound colonial courts.
iii  
Nevertheless, they could be relied upon as decisions of coordinate jurisdiction.
iv  This 
allowed NSW courts to adopt, adapt, or ignore any or all aspects of British precedent 
established after 1828 unsuited to colonial conditions.  Given the colony experienced 
high levels of water scarcity (as does Australia generally) this provided a unique 
opportunity for the NSW judiciary to introduce any one of three water institutions for 
which there was precedent.  These three institutions were:  the prior use rule developed in  3
England before 1833
v; the riparian rights reasonable use doctrine as it evolved in the US 
Atlantic states and England from 1827 onward or;  prior appropriation formalised in the 
American west after 1850.  Theory would predict that NSW courts would have applied 
either the first or last of these common law rules due to aridity.  Instead, contradicting 
theoretical predictions, NSW decisions favoured the second set of common law 
precedents.
vi  From this perspective, if NSW common law outcomes are interpreted using 
the instrumentalist school’s view of the judiciary as explained by Schieber and McCurdy 
(1975) then, it is possible to argue NSW common law was inefficient.  In other words, 
unlike the judiciary in the American west or England over the same period, NSW judges 
failed to adopt a facilitative stance toward entrepreneurial activity making capital 
investment less profitable.
vii  This paper explores whether this is an accurate 
interpretation of common law water rights in colonial NSW.  Furthermore, the analysis 
will consider how the adoption of riparian rights and the apparent divergence from 
theoretical predictions might be explained in the NSW context.   
 
The plan of the paper is as follows:  section two outlines the development of the riparian 
doctrine determined by cases in eastern American states and Britain from the 1830s 
onward.  This period saw the introduction of a more rigid interpretation of riparian rights 
via the application of the reasonable use doctrine.  Strictly defined, reasonable use 
prevented upstream riparian owners from damming, diverting, or otherwise reducing flow 
in any way that would negatively impact downstream users’ correlative rights.  In NSW, 
water scarcity created a situation where, in the more arid areas, like the western district of 
the Riverina, dams and diversions were critical to allow settlers to make productive use  4
of land without river frontage.  Yet, decisions by the NSW judiciary appear to ignore this 
implication.  This would have reduced private capital investment in such activities and 
therefore, reduced economic development.  Section three provides a brief description of 
the evolution of prior appropriation in California and the subsequent hybrid system of 
water adopted in a number of other western states.  The choice of the Californian doctrine 
might appear surprising given NSW aridity would suggest perhaps riparian rights should 
have been superseded by prior appropriation as was the case in Nevada, Arizona, 
Colorado and other more arid states of the west.  However, the choice is based on the 
striking similarities between California and NSW during the period being considered 
here.  The most significant for the purposes of this analysis is that predominant economic 
activity took place on publicly owned lands.  As explained below, it was the difference in 
government action toward this occupation that created divergent paths of water rights 
institutions adopted in the two areas.   
 
Section four provides a brief history of the path of economic development in NSW to 
offer context to the legal environment in which riparian rights evolved.  Details focus 
specifically on the expansion of settlement, government attempts to control this, and the 
corollary growth of the pastoral sector.  An understanding of these factors allows for 
illumination of water right decisions at common law.  Section five analyses two 
important questions.  First, why the NSW Supreme Court determined water rights cases 
using the riparian doctrine under arid conditions?  It is argued that legislative 
developments during the period limited the courts ability to be flexible in the application 
of water right institutions.  However, it did retain flexibility in interpretation of the  5
precedent it applied.  This leads to the second question: can the strict interpretation of 
reasonable use that was employed be understood in the context of NSW given the 
theoretical predictions noted above?  Section six gives some brief concluding remarks 
and some suggestions for possible future research. 
 
2.  The development of Riparian Rights 
Riparian rights are a class of privileges that resemble the more general property law 
doctrine of nuisance and the general tort law of negligence.
viii  These rights are acquired 
only by individuals owning land coming in contact with a water source, conferring on 
them usufructuary rights to water.  Under common law, when land borders a river or 
stream, the boundary of ownership extends to the bed of the water source.  In this way, 
individuals own land ad medium filum aquae (to the ‘middle thread’).  Therefore, it is by 
virtue of position that they acquire rights to make use of the water flowing over this land.  
For this reason, riparian rights are correlative where each land owner is expected to make 
use of water in a way that is not inconsistent with the rights of other riparian owners 
along the same watercourse.   
 
Prior to industrialisation in England and the US, common law interpretation of riparian 
rights had been stable for many years.  Traditionally, courts had determined riparian 
cases based on ancient use, providing protection for individuals with the oldest uses.  
However, changes in water use during industrialisation challenged this approach as the 
need to protect and encourage increased capital investment.  As a result, riparian rights 
evolved significantly during the nineteenth century, developing many of its modern  6
precepts.  Perhaps the most crucial change was the replacement of ancient use with 
reasonable use.  This was far from a smooth transition, and the timeline of change is 
worth a brief discussion. 
 
Prior to the formalisation of reasonable use, courts in some US states and England had 
begun to determine water conflicts using the rule of prior-use.  In England this rule 
developed from the 1600s onward as courts attempted to clarify prescriptive rights, what 
they were and how they came into being.
ix  Shury v Piggot
x is the most cited of these 
cases where the court established seniority of right.  This established precedent for 
subsequent claimants to employ prior-use as the basis for asserting or defending rights to 
water.
xi  Nevertheless for the next century, the implications of this doctrine resulted in 
considerable confusion for English jurists.
xii  Blackstone’s Commentaries in the late 
eighteenth century attempted to provide clarity of the issue by stating that rights to 
flowing water should follow occupancy, or first possession.
xiii  This rule was 
subsequently followed in the influential case of Bealey v Shaw (1805).
xiv  In applying 
prior use, the Chief Justice, Lord Ellenborough, noted individuals have the right to 
advantage of waters flowing in their land without diminution or alteration by others.
xv  
This judgment implies it was not simply prior use that provided a water user with the 
right to have flow without interruption it was a right to the natural flow of the river itself.  
Prior-use was a radical departure from ancient use and created complexity in 
determination of cases at a time when such intricacies reduced the common laws 
responsiveness to increasing water use conflict.  In part, this can explain the ensuing 
adoption of reasonable use in England.  Subsequent to English cases, judges in the US  7
(for instance, Massachusetts) also began to apply the prior-use rule.  However, they were 
motivated by somewhat different circumstances compared with English courts.   
Specifically, decisions in US cases were an attempt to overcome inefficient statutes that 
failed to create clear rights when similar uses, for instance mill owners, came into 
conflict.
xvi  Nonetheless, by the nineteenth century, both English and US courts came to 
favour the reasonable use doctrine. 
 
Reasonable use was first applied in a New York case, Palmer v Mulligan (1805)
xvii in 
response to pollution and flow interruptions.  In Palmer the court established the basis for 
creation of correlative rights to water use that became the foundation for interpretation of 
riparian rights. Essentially the judgment found riparians had equal rights to use the water 
source and uses could involve some inconvenience to others however, these were not 
actionable if they were merely minor.
xviii  These principles were further refined in the US 
Supreme Court case of Tyler v Wilkinson (1827).
xix  Justice Story rejected the plaintiff’s 
mere priority of appropriation and reasoned that because the right to enjoy flow in a 
channel was an incident of riparian land, every riparian owner must own the right to use 
flow.
xx  For this reason, he asserted that any diversion or interference must not reduce the 
value of the common right.
xxi Furthermore, the reasonableness of a particular diversion or 
interference should be considered given the circumstances.  By definition this latter 
consideration instructed the jurists in subsequent cases to consider the size of the river at 
issue.    English courts followed this US precedent, albeit after a lag of twenty years.  In 
England, reasonable use was first applied in Wood v Waud
xxii and later refined in Embrey  8
v Owen.
xxiii  Embrey was the more influential of the two cases citing the US precedent in 
Tyler.
xxiv  Thus, the judgment, handed down by Parkes, J. defined reasonableness stating: 
All that the law requires of the party by or over whose land a stream passes, is, that he should use 
the water in a reasonable manner, and do so as not to destroy, or render useless, or materially 
diminish or affect the application of water by the proprietors above or below on the stream.
xxv  
 
The legal development of riparian rights, particularly, the reasonable use doctrine reflects the 
different paths of economic development experienced in both the US and England (as did 
the evolution of prior appropriation in California noted above).  Initially, US Atlantic 
states were confronted with water use conflicts between mill owners and farmers or 
households, leading to legislative action that gave priority of water use to the former 
because those activities were more economically valuable.
xxvi  However, legislation was 
incomplete because it failed to indicate a priority use where two mill owners came into 
conflict.  Therefore, these disputes were settled in the courts leading to the introduction of 
reasonable use.  In England, the opposite occurred, with mill owners being primary 
stream users before the nineteenth century.  As industrialisation accelerated, accompanied 
by significant population expansion and competing water uses, conflicts became centred 
on use of the river to carry water away versus its use to provide urban water.
xxvii  And, 
much like what occurred in the US, these disputes were settled using the common law 
leading to the adoption of reasonable use as described above. 
 
3.  The California Doctrine 
The California doctrine evolved primarily out of the needs of an expanding gold mining 
sector during the mid-nineteenth century.  Gold discoveries in the late 1840s encouraged 
a large population influx over the proceeding decades.  Notably, the discovery of gold 
occurred just after California had been annexed to the US following the war with Mexico.   9
As a result, by the time of the gold rushes, there were no government controls placed on 
the possession or use of natural resources within the state with most Californian land 
being owned by the federal government.  Gold mining was a lucrative economic activity 
which required relatively high levels of capital investment therefore, the delineation of 
property rights to natural resources was crucial.  In the absence of a state legislature, 
miners themselves created regulations to enforce rights to claims and key inputs, such as 
water.
xxviii  Water became governed by principles of priority of use where a person that 
was first in time, was first in right.  This became known as the prior appropriation 
doctrine.  Prior appropriation allowed miners to divert water onto non-riparian lands and 
permitted transfers between individuals.  However, as explained below, seniority of water 
rights based on first occupation was not a new concept.  In fact, as discussed in section 
three, courts in both the US and England applied this dictum to a number of cases prior to 
the 1850s.  
 
Paralleling informal prior appropriation among miners, in 1850, the newly formed 
California legislature passed an act adopting English common law throughout the state.  
Kanazawa (1998) argues this was aimed at reducing the costs and uncertainty of 
producing legal rulings because most judges and lawyers were acquainted with the 
common law and the necessary materials were readily available to them.  In passing this 
legislation, an existing part of the English common law thus adopted was the riparian 
doctrine.  Riparian rights limited the right to water use to individuals who owned land 
abutting a water source.  However, prior appropriation did not rely on land ownership, 
allowing any person to claim a right to water based on their action of using it.  Therefore,  10
it was inevitable that such contradictory sets of rights would create conflict ultimately 
decided within the courts.   
 
Between 1853 and 1857 there was inconsistency in the California Supreme Court’s 
application of riparian rights.  For instance, the court supported elements of the riparian 
doctrine drawn from both English and eastern American cases in Eddy v Simpson
xxix and 
Crandall v Woods
xxx.  However, in Irwin v Phillips
xxxi the court found in favour of the 
individual making first use of the water based on invoking the English common law rule 
of disseisin or ‘naked possession.’
xxxii  The rule allowed miners to acquire possessory 
rights to land if the legal owner did not act to prevent a trespasser.
xxxiii  Given neither the 
US federal government nor the newly formed Californian state government acted to 
prevent the occupation and use of public lands by miners, possessory rights were 
permitted. Possessory rights were based on the presumption of a land grant being made.  
This allowed the California Supreme Court to support the fundamental principle of prior 
appropriation in water use.  However, these events confined the application of prior 
appropriation to water rights in the public domain
xxxiv, thereby indicating that on privately 
owned lands, principles of the riparian doctrine would be used to determine cases.   
Hence, the California doctrine was created. 
 
During the early years of development of the California doctrine as briefly outlined 
above, an important consideration for the California Supreme Court was to provide 
secure water rights to facilitate capital investment in gold mining.  Water was a crucial 
input for successful mining and was often required a long distances from the source.  In  11
this context, the rigidities of riparian rights would have imposed limitations on the 
continued expansion of the industry by reducing private capital investment.  It was these 
conditions that prompted miners to informally regulate use to achieve efficiency via prior 
appropriation.  California Supreme Court judgments show a tendency on the part of the 
judiciary to give formal sanction to these informal miners’ codes.  In the early years of 
application, this support provided incentives for bargaining between bilateral riparian 
owners and appropriators because transaction costs of negotiation were low.
xxxv  This 
supported Coasean bargaining and efficient use.
xxxvi   Such an outcome substantiates 
Posner’s (2003) claim that the common law tends toward efficiency this indicates the 
judiciary played a crucial role in promoting economic development in California via its 
impact on water law.
xxxvii 
 
4.  Economic development in colonial NSW 
As outlined in sections 2 and 3 above, developments in water law between the 
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries provided NSW courts with an extensive body of 
precedent from which to draw when making decisions.  Essentially, this case law 
established three different water institutions that could be applied in NSW:  prior use; 
riparian rights and associated reasonable use principles or; prior appropriation.  As noted 
in the introduction, theory would predict that because NSW was arid the judiciary would 
apply either the first or the third of these institutions.  Yet this failed to eventuate as court 
decisions adopted riparian rights and gave a strict interpretation to the reasonableness 
requirement.  However, before the discussion turns to an analysis of this divergence from 
theory in NSW, a brief outline of economic development in the colony is warranted.    12
 
NSW was the first Australian colony established by Britain for convict settlement.  The 
first group of convicts arrived in 1788 and the colony remained relatively small in terms 
of the free population for the next few decades.
xxxviii  By 1802 the population numbered 
5,866 however, only 404, or 0.7 per cent, were free settlers.
xxxix  For much of this early 
period, the military administration concentrated its efforts on increasing agricultural 
productivity to make the colony self-sufficient in food production.  During this period, 
land policy was dominated by free grants from colonial administrators to settlers.
xl  This 
method of allocation continued well into the 1830s.  Land grant allocation was influenced 
by Wakefieldian theories of systematic colonisation encouraging administrators to 
control geographic expansion of the colony.
xli  To these ends, in 1829, colonial 
administrators passed legislation defining the boundaries of legal settlement, referred to 
as the Nineteen Counties.  Beyond these boundaries, settlement was illegal and subject to 
criminal prosecution.  However, land degradation, coupled with the increasing value of 
Australian wool on British markets encouraged settlers to cross prescribed boundaries in 
the search for better grazing land.
xlii  Moreover, the length of the boundary, some 900 
miles, and low police numbers made it impossible for administrators to prevent this 
population movement.  Settlers that illegally occupied territory outside the Nineteen 
Counties became known as squatters. 
 
During the period of squatter occupation, approximately 1830 to 1880, the pastoral sector 
dominated the economy and by 1850 it accounted for over 77% of the total value of 
colonial exports.
xliii  As noted, like Californian miners during the late 1840s, squatters  13
occupied publicly owned (Crown) land.  However, unlike California, NSW colonial 
administrators acted quickly to assert Crown title to this land.  Evidence suggests that this 
was not to prevent creation of possessory rights that could be claimed at some later date 
rather, it was in response to demands of squatters themselves.  The colonial government 
complied with squatters requests in an effort to support continued growth of the pastoral 
sector.  To these ends, administrators established a land licensing system in 1836.
xliv  
Under this system, squatters had to purchase a £10 licence that allowed them to occupy as 
much land as they wanted in any district outside the boundaries of official settlement.  
Nevertheless, all colonial land, other than that given in free grants, remained owned by 
the Crown with squatters simply acquiring occupancy rights.  This permitted the Crown 
to evict squatters at any time without compensation.  As a result, the 1836 licensing 
system did not give squatters security of tenure or protect their land improvement 
investments and land right conflicts continued into the 1840s.
xlv   
 
During the 1840s squatters continued to lobby government for secure property rights.  A 
compromise was reached in 1847 with amendment to the licensing arrangement granting 
squatters pre-emptive rights.  Pre-emptive rights allowed squatters to purchase their land 
before or in preference to others.
xlvi  This increased their ability to maintain control of 
land claims against any future redistribution by government.
xlvii  Like the licensing 
system introduced a decade earlier, this concession was motivated by the economic 
significance of the pastoral sector as the colony’s main export sector.  However, it did not 
reduce administrative control of colonial land.  A decision that proved crucial for the 
promotion of economic development in the decades following the NSW gold rush.  14
 
As noted, the pastoral industry developed mainly in response to the increasing value of 
Australian wool on British markets however, it had two significant advantages over more 
permanent forms of agriculture.  First, it required low levels of capital and labour both of 
which were relatively scarce.  Second, it was a relatively drought tolerant industry in that 
it reduced the risks associated with extreme water scarcity experienced frequently in the 
more arid districts of NSW.    Grazing reduced the cost of drought because it was a 
geographically mobile industry with sheep being able to be moved great distances at 
relatively low costs.  To compliment mobility advantages, squatters scattered their land 
claims over wide areas.  These advantages, combined with an abundance of land, made 
the pastoral industry the main driver of economic development before 1850.  However, 
after 1850, gold accounted for a higher proportion of GDP than the pastoral sector and by 




In the early years of the gold rush (1850 to 1860) mining and pastoral activities took 
place in different geographic locations in NSW.  This reduced the conflict over land use 
between the two sectors.
xlix  However, by 1860, the exhaustion of low cost alluvial gold 
supplies resulted in unemployment.  To alleviate unemployment, the colonial government 
instituted land reform policy, free selection before survey (selection), in 1861.  The 
policy mirrored homesteading introduced during a similar period in the American west.  
In NSW, under the Crown Lands Occupation Act (1861) squatters’ could secure lease to 
a limited acreage (320 acres) via an auction system and pay a flat rental rate.  Once  15
leasehold was acquired, squatters’ retained pre-emptive rights to purchase this land under 
freehold on expiration of the lease.  After obtaining freehold, squatters had the right to 
lease adjoining land three times the size of the freehold property at a rental of £2 per 
square mile, per annum.  This circumvented 1847 legislation by limiting pre-emptive 
rights to much smaller areas of land than occupied by squatters.  However, loop-holes in 
the legislation made it easy for squatters to evade these requirements by using dummy 
selectors.  Dummying involved squatters’ contracting with agents to select part of the 
land they occupied, register the claim with the Department of Lands (often under false 
names), and then sell it back to the squatter for a small fee.  This practice also involved 
the registration of land selected under family members’ names, including children.  The 
use of dummying implies two things: squatters placed a higher value on the land than 
selectors and; the size of claims squatters’ were allowed was too small.  In general, these 
evasion tactics were successful, leading to the failure of selection policy to effectively 
redistribute colonial lands to small holders with squatters’ retaining control over a 
majority of the land they originally occupied.
l 
 
It was between 1850 and 1870 that the bulk of water disputes were decided by the 
Supreme Court.  However, as might be expected given the outline above, because NSW 
was a relatively new settlement with an initially high proportion of convict population 
case numbers were much lower than in England or the US.  In total, five cases came 
before the Supreme Court during the period of observation.  The judgments in these cases 
imposed riparian rights, instigating the reasonable use rule in accordance with English 
precedent.  In and of itself, this implies that even though high water scarcity persisted in  16
some areas, particularly during drought, there was little conflict over water use.  This is 
linked to the advantages of grazing as described above.  Whether the strict interpretation 
of reasonable use supports the claim that NSW common law was inefficient will be 
discussed below.     
 
5.  Common Law Efficiency in NSW 
The NSW Supreme Court was the highest court in the colony during the period.   
England’s Privy Council mirrored the role of the present-day Australian High Court in 
that it only determined cases involving inter-colonial disputes or where legislation 
expressly granted individuals leave to appeal Supreme Court decisions to the Council.
li  It 
is important to note each Australian colony was independent until Federation in 1901; 
therefore cases determined in other colonies did not bind the NSW Supreme Court.   
However, like British courts, inter-colonial judgements could be relied upon as decisions 
of coordinate jurisdictions.  It is for these reasons that the NSW Supreme Court could 
choose any of the three water institutions noted above.  An explanation of the choice 
arrived at and the impacts on efficiency are discussed below. 
 
As noted, the first option available to the NSW Supreme Court was to adopt prior use as 
developed in England before 1833.  However, evidence suggests there was no legal basis 
for its application in NSW.  Prior use was based on prescriptive rights established by 
occupancy.  Occupancy rights presume the absence of any prior occupant and therefore, 
no resource rights exist at all.
lii  This rule could not be applied in NSW because the 
Crown had claimed its right to colonial resources, including water as an incidence of land  17
claims.  Accordingly, the Crown itself was the prior occupant.  If the Crown was the 
occupant then no prescriptive rights could exist.  Without being able to prove prescriptive 
rights, prior use could not be employed as a remedy in water rights conflicts.  In addition, 
no colonial legislation created the possibility for prescriptive rights to be obtained. 
 
The NSW Supreme Court expressly dealt with this issue in two cases: Cooper v 
Corporation of Sydney and Howell v Prince.
liii  In Cooper at issue was the plaintiff’s 
entitlement to compensation for reduction of water flowing to his property created by the 
defendant’s diversions to supply the city of Sydney.  During the judgment, the court 
briefly considered the issue of prescription and whether, in the absence of legislation 
similar to that passed in England, it was possible for the judiciary to instruct the jury to 
presume a grant. Stephen C.J. emphatically denied this potential maintaining, “all lands 
have been, throughout the colony, at a very recent date, in the hands of the Crown, and 
that there can be no grant from the Crown, except by record open to everybody.”
liv  By 
virtue of these claims, if access to water was an aspect of the land in question, the Crown 
declaration included ownership of water.  Nevertheless, Stephen C.J. added, 
 
But, in addition to this, the Crown has never occupied or used the land, form whence the water 
claimed is derived, except only for the purposes of supplying the city with that element.  Would 
not the presumption, therefore, of a Crown grant, conveying to an individual the surplus, or casual 
overflowing of the water from that land, be too violent to be adopted by any tribunal?
lv 
 
This statement appears to leave open the possibility for prescription to be claimed in 
subsequent cases thereby allowing for prior use to be introduced at some future date.   18
However, 16 years later, in Howell, the court expressly denies this potential in the 
absence of legislative authority with Hargrave J. stating, 
 
The alveus of the stream cannot lawfully be interfered with.  The Prescription Act ought to be 
adopted, so that the rights of persons may be protected who have enjoyed the use of the water, it 
may be for many years, and whose enjoyment has been acquiesced in.
 lvi 
 
The outcome in Howell can also be used to explain why prior appropriation was unable to 
be adopted in NSW.  As noted, prior appropriation relied upon disseisin or ‘naked 
possession’ to create possessory rights.  Once possessory rights were obtained, prior 
appropriation had common law foundation.  In NSW, because the colonial government 
had acted to regulate trespassing on Crown land via licenses, thereby asserting its rights 
as original owner, no possessory rights could be created.  As a result, there was no 
common law foundation for prior appropriation.  Clark (1970) supports these findings 
arguing that at no time did the colonial government allow a period of legislative inaction 
in which custom could develop into a recognised body of law.   
 
The precedent establishing reasonable use in NSW was Cooper with Embrey being cited 
as the authority.  On this basis, the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable flow of water as 
incident to the property of land.  Furthermore, the court claimed that the law, as it 
affected such cases, was clear.  This decision was reaffirmed in Pring v Marina.
lvii  In 
Pring, the defendant erected a dam preventing water flow to downstream users.  The 
plaintiff argued this reduced the value of his station (parcel of land).  Here, the court 
again relied on Embrey to apply the reasonable use doctrine.  Based on the decision in 
Embrey, the judgment in Pring found that an individual experiencing any interference 
with their rights, however imperceptible, retained a right of action at common law to  19
prevent the continuation of the action causing the interference.  In light of the Crown’s 
action to retain control of colonial resources, it is arguable that the Supreme Court had no 
legal foundation to apply anything other than riparian rights in these cases.  Nevertheless, 
the court did retain flexibility in the way it interpreted the riparian precedent it cited.  
Interpretation could have been lenient or strict.   
 
A lenient interpretation of Embrey could allow the court to argue that the condition of 
water scarcity meant in the more arid districts of the colony dams were only a minor 
inconvenience and they did not reduce the value of the common right.  Tyler established a 
precedent for this and the judgment would have been known by the NSW Supreme Court 
given it was cited in Embrey.  In fact, Chief Justice Stephen’s opening statement in the 
judgment of Pring states, “The erection of a dam by a riparian owner across a running 
stream, might, perhaps, under some circumstances, be lawful.”
lviii  However, there is no 
suggestion of under what circumstances this might apply.  In addition, immediately 
following this statement he claims, “But it cannot be so, I conceive, if it obstruct – though 
for one moment only – the flow of the entire stream to the other lands below.”
lix  Thus, 
the strict interpretation of reasonableness was incorporated into NSW common law.  This 
raises two important questions.  Why did the NSW Supreme Court adhere to this strict 
interpretation and; how do these decisions fit in with the argument that common law 
tends toward efficiency if, due to aridity, the theoretically optimal solution was individual 
ownership?  To explain this apparent contradiction in the evolution of NSW water law 
the efficiency of appropriative rights in the NSW context needs to be explored.   
  20
During the period being examined two factors reduced the efficiency of appropriative 
rights in NSW compared with California: intensity of water use and the economic impact 
of water scarcity on grazing.  First, intensity of water use in NSW was low during this 
period with grazing being primarily non-consumptive.  Rose (1990) argues that where 
consumptive uses are low; water takes on a pubic good aspect where its value is higher if 
used in unity.  Theoretically, this leads to a preference for correlative compared with 
appropriative rights because predominant uses mean the waterway better lends itself to 
common-pool sharing arrangements.
lx  In addition, unlike mining in California, grazing 
was less capital intensive with the marginal product of land being higher than any other 
input, including water.  Therefore, capital investment losses associated with riparian 
rights’ were lower in NSW than they would have been had the doctrine been retained in 
Californian mining areas.  Furthermore, because of low population density, high 
transaction prevailed in NSW.  This prevented bargaining around the initial allocation of 
rights, thereby reducing the effectiveness of specifying individual appropriative rights.
lxi  
For these reasons, empirical evidence suggests the creation of correlative rights under the 
riparian doctrine by the NSW Supreme Court fits theoretical predictions of the evolution 
of water rights because the water use was primarily non-consumptive and transaction 
costs were high preventing bilateral bargaining. 
 
Second, water scarcity in more arid districts limited the efficiency gains from 
appropriative rights because periods of extreme drought would have magnified losses for 
downstream owners.  This reinforced the high value of water when used in unity.  The 
decision in Embrey recognised this as a crucial consideration at that time in English  21
development where the court explicitly noted that without the qualification of correlative 
rights based on reasonable use, “rivers and streams would become utterly useless, either 
for manufacturing or agricultural purposes.”
lxii  Supreme Court judgments applying 
reasonable use in NSW explicitly followed the precedent as established in Embrey.  This 
outcome suggests that the NSW Supreme Court recognised the public good aspect of 
water in the colony and the potentially large losses associated with appropriative rights.  
In applying reasonable use the court not only mitigated these effects but also provided for 
a relatively even distribution of rents accruing from water use thereby supporting 
economic growth.  Considered in conjunction with Schedvin’s (1990) claims that 
Australian economic development relied on exploitation of a series of staple products of 
which wool was one, there is little doubt that water law decisions between 1850 and 1870 
supported this process.  In terms of the theoretical framework, these empirical findings 
suggest that under conditions where intensity of water use is low, economic development 
is driven by non-capital intensive industries, and water scarcity prevails, correlative rights 
may be more efficient.  Therefore, NSW Supreme Court decisions did tend toward 
efficiency by imposing common-pool sharing arrangements and correlative water rights. 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper analysed the apparent divergence between theoretical predictions concerning 
the evolution of water rights under arid conditions and outcomes in colonial NSW from 
the perspective of common law efficiency.  It was shown that of the three institutional 
choices for exploitation of water resources, prior use, prior appropriation, and riparian 
rights, there was no common law foundation for the introduction of the first two 
arrangements.  This was because occupancy and the correlative existence of prescriptive  22
rights could not be established due to government claiming rights to all land and thereby, 
water within the colony for the Crown.  Based on this outcome, the introduction of 
riparian rights was inevitable.  In turn, the findings suggest adherence to a strict 
interpretation of the reasonable use doctrine developed in US and English courts by the 
NSW Supreme Court between 1850 and 1870 was consistent with theoretical models 
given the dominance of non-consumptive water use and water scarcity considerations.  
Non-consumptive water use led to water taking on aspects of a public good leading to a 
higher value when used in unity.  This meant that, as theory would predict, correlative 
rights were more efficient.  In addition, high transaction costs and low levels of capital 
investment in the pastoral industry reduced the losses associated with correlative 
compared to appropriative rights.  High levels of water scarcity during drought reinforced 
these outcomes as correlative riparian rights allowed for a more equitable distribution of 
resource rents.  For these reasons, the Supreme Court’s adherence to a strict interpretation 
of reasonable use as established by English precented supported expansion of the pastoral 
industry and thereby, economic development.  As a result, the common law of water 
rights in colonial NSW tended toward efficiency. 
 
These findings present a couple of potential areas for further research.  First, additional 
comparative work could be undertaken to examine whether common law outcomes in 
other Australian colonies mirrored efficiency as in NSW.  Given the tendency toward 
convergence in water law in Australia, especially in the twentieth century, this would 
provide further empirical tests of the robustness of property-right theory.  More broadly, 
the high levels of government control over the allocation of many resources in NSW, for  23
example gold and water, from very early on in its history provides an interesting basis for 
comparative development studies between the US west and NSW.  Given the important 
role of natural resources in NSW development (and more broadly Australia) such 
comparative work could further illuminate the impact of institutional arrangements on the 
path of economic growth in relatively rich nations.  This would offer depth to recent 
studies analysing the impact of colonial heritage and institutional choice, particularly the 





Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. A. (2001), ‘The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: an Empirical Investigation’, American Economic Review, 91 
(5), December, pp. 1369-1401 
 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. A. (2002), ‘Reversal of Fortune: Geography 
and Institutions in the making of the Modern World Income Distribution’, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 117, November, pp. 1231-1294 
 
Anderson, T. L. and Hill, P. J. (1975), ‘The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the 
American West’, Journal of Law and Economics, 18(1), pp. 163-179 
 
Bird, R. and Osborn, P. G. (1983) Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, UK, Seventh Edition 
 
Davis, P. N. (1971), Australian Irrigation Law and Administration, Volume One, Thesis 
Submitted as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Juridical Science, 
University of Wisconsin, USA  
 
Kanazawa, M. T. (1998), ‘Efficiency in Western Water Law: the development of the 
California doctrine 1850-1911,’ Journal of Legal Studies, 27(1), pp. 159-185 
 
Kociumbas, J. (1988), The Oxford History of Australia, Volume One: ‘Possessions’, 
Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 
 
Lauer, T. E. (1963), ‘The Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine’, Missouri 
Law Review, 28, pp. 60-107 
 
McCurdy, C. W. (1976), ‘Stephen J. Field ad Public Lands Law Development in 
California, 1850-1886: a case study of judicial resource allocation in nineteenth-century 
America’, Law and Society Review, 10(2), pp. 235-266 
 
Perry, T. M. (1963), Australia’s First Frontier: The Spread of Settlement in New South 
Wales, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, Australia 
 
Pisani, D. J. (1987), ‘Enterprise and Equity: A critique of western water law in the 
nineteenth century,’ The Western Historical Quarterly, 18(1), pp. 15-37 
 
Posner, R. E. (2003), Economic Analysis of Law, Little and Brown, Boston, US 
 
Roberts, S. H. (1924), History of Australian Land Settlement, Macmillan Press, 
Melbourne, Australia 
 
Rose, C. M. (1990), ‘Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water 
Rights, Journal of Legal Studies, 19(2), pp. 261-296  25
 
Scott, A. and Coustalin, G. (1995), ‘The Evolution of Water Rights’, Natural Resources 
Journal, 35, pp. 821-980  
 
Schedvin, C. B. (1990), ‘Staples and Regions of Pax Britannica,’ The Economic History 
Review, 43(4), November, pp. 533-559 
 
Schieber, H. N. and McCurdy, C. W. (1975), ‘Eminent-Domain Law and Western 
Agriculture,’ Agricultural History, 49(1), pp.112-130 
 
Sokoloff, K. L. and Engerman, S.L. (2000), ‘History Lessons: Institutions, Factor 
Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 14 (3), Summer, pp. 217-232 
 
Umbeck, J. R. (1981), A Theory of Property Rights: with application to the Californian 
gold rush, Iowa State University Press, USA 
 
Vamplew, W. (ed.) (1987), Australian Historical Statistics, Fairfax, Syme and Weldon 





























                                                 
i Anderson, T. L. and Hill, P. J. (1975), ‘The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West’, 
Journal of Law and Economics, 18(1), pp. 163-179; Rose, C. M. (1990), ‘Energy and Efficiency in the 
Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, Journal of Legal Studies, 19(2), pp. 261-296; Scott, A. and 
Coustalin, G. (1995), ‘The Evolution of Water Rights’, Natural Resources Journal, 35, pp. 821-980; 
Kanazawa, M. T. (1998), ‘Efficiency in Western Water Law: the development of the California doctrine 
1850-1911,’ Journal of Legal Studies, 27(1), pp. 159-185 
ii 9 Geo. IV. c83 
iii Section 24 stated: “That all Laws and Statutes in force within the Realm of England at the Time of the 
passing of this Act, (not being inconsistent herewith, or with any Charter or Letters Patent or Order in 
Council which may be issued in the pursuance hereof), shall be applied in the Administration of Justice in 
the Courts in New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land respectively, so far as the same can be applied 
within the said Colonies; and as often as any Doubt shall arise as to the Application of any such Laws or 
Statutes in the said Colonies respectively, by and with the Advice of the Legislative Councils of the said 
Colonies respectively, by Ordinances to be by them for that Purpose made, to declare whether such Laws or 
Statutes shall be deemed to extend to the Colonies, and to be in force within the same, or to make and 
establish such Limitations and Modifications of any such Laws and Statutes within the said Colonies 
respectively as may be deemed expedient on that Behalf: Provided always, that in the meantime, and before 
any such Ordinances shall actually be made, it shall be the Duty of the said Supreme Courts, as often as any 
such Doubts shall arise upon the Trial of any Information or Action, or upon any other Proceeding before 
them, to adjudge and decide as to the Application of any such Laws or Statutes in the said Colonies 
respectively” (9 Geo. IV. c83).  In the years following, two NSW Supreme Court decisions: Ex parte 
Nichols (1 Legge 123 (NSW 1839)) and Williamson v The New South Wales Marine Assurance Co. (2 
Legge 975 (NSW 1856), stated that English court decisions were not binding in the colony.  In Williamson 
the judgment specifically noted: “As to the decisions by the Superior Courts in the United Kingdom, the 
greatest respect were paid to these decisions when brought before the Court in the ordinary way, but the 
fact of one Superior Court having decided in a particular way, did not amount to a sufficient reason why the 
Court here should alter its judgment” (2 Legge 975 (NSW 1856)). 
iv The Supreme Court explicitly noted the coordinate jurisdiction of lower English courts in Ex parte 
Dunne.  In this case, Martin C. J. stated: “The [NSW Supreme] Court, like the Queen’s Bench, Common 
Pleas, or Exchequer, is a Court of coordinate jurisdiction.  If it sees reason to differ in any case from any of 
these Courts, it may with propriety do so, in the same way as those Courts not infrequently differ from one 
another” (Ex parte Dunne, 13 NSW (L.) 210, 217 (1875)).  However, the Supreme Court was bound by 
decisions of the Privy Council. 
v Prior use in England was overturned by Lord Denman’s decision in Mason v Hill (10 Eng. Rep. 692 
(1833)).  In this case Denman systematically invalidated much of the fundamental principles of prior use 
that had developed since the 1600s (refer to Scott and Coustalin 1995, pp 863-868 for a detailed analysis of 
the decision). 
vi Cases that implemented the reasonable use rule of riparian rights in NSW in line with English precedent 
were: Cooper v Corporation of Sydney (1 Legge 765 (NSW 1853)); (Lord v Commissioners of the City of 
Sydney (12 Moo. P.C. 473, 14 Eng Rep (1859) (NSW)); Hood v Corporation of Sydney (2 Legge 1294 
(NSW 1860)); Pring v Marina (5 NSW (L.) 390 (1866)); and Howell v Prince (8 NSW (L.) 316 (1869)). 
vii Posner, R. E. (2003), Economic Analysis of Law 
viii Rose, supra note 1 
ix Scott and Coustalin, supra note 1 
x 81 Eng. Rep. 280 (1625) 
xi Lauer, T. E. (1963), ‘The Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine’, Missouri Law Review, 
28, pp. 60-107; Scott and Coustalin, supra note 1 
xii Id. 
xiii Rose, supra note 1 
xiv 6 East 208, 102 Eng. Rep. 1266 
xvLauer supra note 11; Scott and Coustalin, supra note 1 
xvi Rose supra note 1 
xvii 3 Caines R. 307, cited in Rose 1990  27
                                                                                                                                                 
xviii Rose. Supra note 1 
xix 4 Mason’s U.S. Rep. 400 
xx Scott and Coustalin. Supra note 1 
xxi Id. 
xxii 3 Exch. 748, 154 Eng. R. 1047 (1849) 
xxiii 6 Exch. 353 (1851) 
xxiv supra at note 7 
xxv 6 Exch. 371 (1851) 
xxvi Rose supra note 1; Scott and Coustalin supra note 1 
xxvii Lauer supra note 11; Scott and Coustalin supra note 1 
xxviii Umbeck, J. R. (1981), A Theory of Property Rights 
xxix 3 Cal 249, 252 (1853) 
xxx 8 Cal 136, 141 (1857) 
xxxi 5 Cal 140 (1855) 
xxxii Schieber, H. N. and McCurdy, C. W. (1975), ‘Eminent-Domain Law and Western Agriculture,’ 
Agricultural History, 49(1), pp.112-130; McCurdy, C. W. (1976), ‘Stephen J. Field ad Public Lands Law 
Development in California, 1850-1886: a case study of judicial resource allocation in nineteenth-century 
America’, Law and Society Review, 10(2), pp. 235-266; Kanazawa supra note 1 
xxxiii McCurdy supra note 32 
xxxiv Biddle Boggs v Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal 279, 374 (1859), cited in McCurdy 1976. 
xxxv Rose supra note 1; Kanazawa supra  note 1 
xxxvi Kanazawa supra note 1 
xxxvii Pisani, D. J. (1987), ‘Enterprise and Equity: A critique of western water law in the nineteenth century,’ 
The Western Historical Quarterly, 18(1), pp. 15-37 
xxxviii The term ‘free population’ is used here to distinguish those who emigrated to NSW of their own free 
will during the period, exclusive of military personnel and convicts. 
xxxix Roberts, S. H. 1924. History of Australian Land Settlement 
xl Grants were provided to all category of settler, including free settlers, military personnel, freed convicts, 
and administrators (higher ranked military). 
xli Wakefield’s belief was that widespread settlement involved wilful dissipation of resources (Perry, 
Australia’s First Frontier. 1963).  Edward Wakefield (1796-1862) was the most influential of British 
colonial theorists writing during the 1830s (Kociumbas, The Oxford History of Australia. 1988).  He argued 
that Australia suffered from a shortage of wage labour due to the reliance on convict labour, excess free 
land and, dispersed settlement.  Therefore, land should be sold at a ‘sufficient price’ with the proceeds of 
sales going to capitalists to pay for importing free labour to work for them.  This would transplant to new 
colonies a well balanced and healthy British society and civilisation, remove redundant population from 
Britain and, make possible the establishment of a legislature elected by colonists. 
xlii Vamplew, W. 1987. Australian Historical Statistics. By 1830 the population of NSW numbered 46,958 
of which, 26,702 were free settlers and sheep numbered over half a million (Roberts, History. 1924). 
xliii Vamplew, W. (ed.) (1987), Australian Historical Statistics 
xliv This system was created under the Squatting Act (1836). 
xlv It would be reasonable to suggest this reduced squatters’ incentives to undertake large capital investment 
on their properties however, the extent of this effect would rely on counterfactual analysis. 
xlvi Bird and Osborne, Osborne’s Concise Law Dictionary. 1983 
xlvii Land redistribution was attempted in the 1860s during which legislation was enacted to reduce the size 
of areas subject to pre-emptive rights.  
xlviii White, Mastering Risk. 1992 
xlix There was also little conflict over water between the two sectors because water use in gold mining was 
highly regulated where users acquired rights under administrative regulations rather than common law 
riparian rights. 
l Roberts (1924) notes that over the period of selection eight sections out of every nine passed to original 
occupants and, by 1883, over eight million acres of colonial land was owned by 96 individuals. 
li The Australian High Court determines inter-state conflicts and issues where the states and the 
Commonwealth government are in dispute.  Generally, these cases are concerned with interpretation of the 
Australian Constitution.  Prior to federation, inter-colonial conflicts, usually disagreements about the  28
                                                                                                                                                 
interpretation of Imperial legislation would defer to the Privy Council.  However, this court was generally 
reluctant to involve itself in colonial affairs.  The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council continued to be 
the final court of appeal until the Australia Act (1987). 
lii Rose, 1990 Supra  note 1 
liii 1 Legge 765 (NSW 1853); 8 NSW (L.) 316 (1869) 
liv 1 Legge 765, 771 (NSW 1853) 
lv 1 Legge 765, 771 (NSW 1853) 
lvi 8 NSW (L.) 316, 319 (1869) 
lvii 5 NSW (L.) 390 (1866) 
lviii supra, 396 
lix Id. 396 
lx Kanazawa supra note 1 
lxi Rose supra note 1; Scott and Coustalin supra note 1; Kanazawa supra note 1 
lxii 6 Exch. 353, 371 (1851) 
lxiii Such studies include: Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000 and Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002. 